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tention to the vertical subordination of the 
mind to the impersonal constraints that are 
the mark of the social (top-down). to me, 
the interactive approach should address the 
theoretical articulation of these different 
stances as well as the way they can be practi-
cally switched in situations. This would cer-
tainly help clarify the ambiguous nature of 
the second person, which oscillates between 
an ontological claim about the interactive 
nature of social phenomena, a phenomeno-
logical statement about the human mode 
of engaging with the world, and an episte-
mological contention about the explanatory 
power of interactions.
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> abstract • The commentaries on my 
target article tend to be either support-
ive and expansive or corrective. I respond 
to these commentaries by focusing on 
issues that involve philosophical and 
scientific frameworks, concepts of au-
tonomy, self, and social cognition broadly 
conceived.
« 1 » First, let me thank all of the com-
menters for their careful readings of my arti-
cle and for their criticisms and suggestions. i 
take many of the comments to be either sup-
portive, or corrective, or expansive of what i 
have argued in the target article. For exam-
ple, i find very little to disagree with in Éti-
enne Bimbenet’s expansive comment in which 
he suggests that we all keep our heads even 
as we emphasize the embodied and enactive 
roots of cognition. He is surely right that en-
activists have to do a better job in explaining 
how basic perceptual and action-oriented 
processes translate into the more complex 
types of cognitive performance. Likewise 
Mathieu arminjon’s commentary suggests that 
we need to expand the enactivist account to 
consider not just cognition, but broader so-
cial-political themes. ema Demšar and urban 
Kordeš want to broaden the constructivist 
scope to include predictive processing in a 
way that is consistent with enactivism. hu-
bert Wykretowicz, in a more corrective mode, 
suggests that in regard to the notion of self, 
we need to adjust the focus so that we are 
able to characterize a richer phenomenology 
of the person. Both laurence Kaufmann and 
ahmad abu-akel propose to enrich the enac-
tivist account of social cognition: abu-akel by 
constructing a hybrid that brings theoretical 
inference and simulation back into play, and 
Kaufman by emphasizing the importance of 
third-person processes in the social and 
institutional factors that constrain intersub-
jective interactions. rather than responding 
to each commenter in turn, i will organize 
my response in terms of the issues or themes 
that the commentaries highlight.
Philosophical and scientific 
frameworks
« 2 » Demšar & Kordeš point out the affin-
ity of enactivism, predictive processing (PP), 
and constructivism. in this regard, they af-
firm two principles: first, that knowledge of 
the world is actively constructed; and sec-
ond, that the “function of cognitive systems 
is to adaptively guide behavior (rather than 
to veridically recover ‘reality’)” (§4). The 
first principle is consistent primarily with 
PP, especially in those versions of PP that 
emphasize ongoing construction of a gen-
erative model in a way that makes active in-
ference serve prediction error minimization 
(e.g., Hohwy 2013), and the second one is 
primarily a principle of enactivism. indeed, 
enactivism would treat that first principle as 
a corollary to the second one by reconceiv-
ing active inference as a form of pragmatic 
engagement. Enactivism would say (echoing 
a Marxist slogan): “The real point is not to 
construct the world but to engage with it.” 
Enactivism resists the type of description 
that one can find in some versions of PP 
– that the cognitive system is simply sam-
pling or testing the environment in order to 
identify what is out there. andy Clark, for 
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about “sampling the world in ways designed 
to test our hypotheses” (Clark 2016: 7, 290; 
also see the quotation of Clark in Demšar & 
Kordeš §3). He moves towards a more enac-
tivist view (and the second constructionist 
principle) only when he adds that we sample 
the world “to yield better information for 
the control of action itself ” (ibid).
« 3 » i am in agreement that some ver-
sion of PP can be integrated with enactivism 
(Demšar & Kordeš cite the relevant literature 
in this regard, §19), specifically in regard to 
the kinship of the free-energy principle and 
autopoiesis (Bitbol & Gallagher 2018). as 
Demšar & Kordeš make clear, it is important 
to pick the right metaphors and the right 
vocabulary, or perhaps we should just say a 
productive metaphor and a vocabulary that 
does not mislead us. This is related to what 
Demšar & Kordeš refer to as Q1: “how would 
the traditionally neurocentric study of the 
brain – and more broadly, of the mind – go 
about incorporating perspectives that em-
phatically oppose the narrow neurocentric 
view?” (§13). The short answer is that it can-
not, unless through some Hegelian dialectic 
where negation transforms to a positive (as 
Zaslawski 2018 argues in this issue). short 
of that, we do need alternative vocabular-
ies and an open-mindedness that allows for 
a rethinking of the mind and a new under-
standing of how the brain works. But i would 
also argue that Q1 is too general; the best we 
can do is look at specific areas and try to un-
derstand how brain, body, and environment 
work together to do what they do.
agency and autonomy
« 4 » Both Bimbenet and arminjon raise 
questions about agency and autonomy. Bim-
benet characterizes my analysis as drawing 
a line between natural motor control pro-
cesses and normative (social and linguistic) 
aspects of autonomy. Kaufmann makes a neat 
summary of this point (§2). i do claim, in 
response to the Libet experiments, that mo-
tor control should not be confused with free 
will, but i do not intend to draw a heavy line 
between these realms since i take motor ca-
pacities to be enabling conditions for auton-
omy, which precisely do not float freely in 
the air, but are tied to context. accordingly, 
i agree with Bimbenet’s emphasis on the role 
of communicative and social practices for 
the constitution of autonomy, precisely un-
derstood as relational autonomy. He wants 
(and he wants me) to think more deeply and 
further about such things; at the same time 
he points to my own attempts to emphasize 
the “social thing” (§7; Bimbenet has quota-
tion marks around that phrase but i do not 
know whether it is my phrase or his own). 
indeed, we can look further along a num-
ber of different lines by considering concep-
tions such as the socially extended mind or 
what i have termed “mental institutions” 
(Gallagher 2013a), where examples such as 
legal institutions or the institutions of sci-
ence (slaby & Gallagher 2015) structure our 
complex cognitive accomplishments and 
our intersubjective interactions, and thereby 
add to or subtract from the autonomy of our 
actions.
« 5 » Furthermore, Bimbenet, in fram-
ing his more general challenge concerning 
more complex forms of cognition, and in 
mentioning that imitation, joint attention, 
artifacts and socially formed habits can also 
play roles in enabling or constraining auton-
omy, marks out areas where there already 
is ongoing work by embodied and enactive 
theorists. Lambros Malafouris’s (2013) ma-
terial engagement theory (MEt), for exam-
ple, is just such an attempt to show how the 
material aspects of cultural practices have a 
profound effect on how we think and solve 
problems. Likewise, one can find ongoing 
research on learning, imitation and “natural 
pedagogy” (Csibra & Gergely 2009), as well 
as on the role of narrative in collective in-
tentionality (tollefsen & Gallagher 2017), all 
of which extend the enactivist analysis. Ex-
plaining complex forms of cognition is in-
deed an important challenge for enactivism 
but recent work on imagination, memory, 
problem solving, language, mathematical 
cognition and the idea of embodied ration-
ality in authors such as daniel Hutto and 
Erik Myin (2017), and Ezequiel di Paolo, 
Elena Cuffari and Hanne de Jaegher (2018) 
suggest that enactivist approaches poten-
tially have what it takes to work out explana-
tions of more complex forms of cognition. 
in this respect, to answer Bimbenet’s question 
about whether i agree with Hubert dreyfus’s 
demarcation between basic “mindless” per-
formance and the “upper floor of linguistic 
and conceptual knowledge” (§2), i have 
been pursuing the idea that there is more 
continuity than discontinuity (Gallagher 
2017: Ch. 10). Both disembodied cognition 
and decapitated cognition are myths.
« 6 » arminjon, like Bimbenet, focuses 
on autonomy and agency, but suggests that 
enactivism needs to go beyond questions 
about cognition to address the social and 
political complexities that form the context 
of human life. He wants more detail about 
what he calls my “apartheid and slavery” 
hypothesis (which i mention in §27 of the 
target article). Elsewhere (Gallagher 2013b) 
i explain that the example comes from my 
daughter’s experience in the Peace Corps 
in south africa. Working in a small village 
outside of Pretoria she was attempting to 
convince the villagers to help themselves 
by taking constructive action in the form 
of growing some of their own food. The re-
sponse, as she reports it, was laughter. The 
villagers explained that what she proposed 
was impossible and that she simply did not 
understand. The reason, according to the 
villagers, was because they were lazy. under 
the regime of apartheid this is what they had 
been told and had been raised to believe. 
Their internalization of that message, as 
part of their own self-consciousness, basi-
cally meant that they were robbed of their 
autonomy by the social-political structures 
that had been part of apartheid. as Kaufmann 
suggests, “Little by little, individuals make 
the status of responsible subject ascribed to 
them by others their own and adopt the so-
cial norms of reasonableness and account-
ability with regard to themselves” (§3) – yes, 
but only if others ascribe such norms, and 
for some populations it is all too “little by 
little.”
« 7 » arminjon points to important work 
on “social epidemiology” as it relates to 
the african-american population in the 
united states. in this case the story is about 
the prevalence of arterial hypertension in a 
population that has been oppressed. social 
structure that can rob a people of autono-
my can also have profound bodily effects, 
as research by nancy Krieger and stephen 
sidney (1996) demonstrates, and can shape 
not only a person’s self-consciousness, but 
non-conscious behaviors, or as arminjon puts 
it, produces a “physiological habitus” that 
can limit agency (§§6f). as arminjon points 
out, this is an extremely good example of 
how social and political forces relate to em-
bodiment, beyond the narrow confines of 
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cognition. With respect to the physiological 
aspects of habitus, i can point to the recent 
work i cited in my article on the role of af-
fect (broadly conceived to include hunger, 
fatigue, and other physiologically based 
processes that constitute the physiological 
habitus) in constraining cognition, behavior, 
and social interaction (e.g., Colombetti 2014 
Bower & Gallagher 2013). With specific ref-
erence to how embodied-enactivist accounts 
can address social and political issues, axel 
Honneth (2008) shows that an understand-
ing of primary and secondary intersubjec-
tivity has direct relevance to basic notions 
of autonomy, recognition, and justice,1 and i 
suspect that arminjon and i would be in gen-
eral agreement about this.
a complicated phenomenology 
of the self and other
« 8 » Questions about agency and au-
tonomy, as both arminjon and Bimbenet are 
aware, are directly related to questions about 
self and our relations with others. With re-
spect to the notion of self, Wykretowicz of-
fers a critical perspective on the notion of 
self-pattern, concerned primarily about 
the phenomenological unity of the self. We 
agree that the self is not something that is 
reducible to neuronal patterns, but Wykre-
towicz worries about the unity of subjective 
life. He is right to suggest that for me the 
unity of self-experience is in some way tied 
to what i have called the minimal self (Gal-
lagher & Zahavi 2012), or what i call here 
the minimal experiential aspect (or some-
times just the “experiential aspect”) of the 
self-pattern (Gallagher & daly 2018). There 
is an ambiguity to this aspect insofar as in 
some respects it is both an abstraction (there 
is no such thing just on its own – it always 
involves a temporally extended context and 
is always related to other aspects of the self-
pattern) and something that is very concrete 
(insofar as it is constituted by first-person 
perspectival and fully embodied proprio-
ceptive/kinaesthetic experiences of owner-
ship and agency). This experiential aspect is 
itself a pattern within a larger pattern, and 
i have characterized such a pattern as a dy-
namical gestalt. it is dynamical in the sense 
1 | i discuss Honneth’s analysis in my forth-
coming book, Action and Interaction (oxford 
university Press).
that the dynamical relations that tie the dif-
ferent aspects of the self-pattern together 
constitute its unity. and it is a gestalt in the 
sense defined by Kurt Goldstein:
“ although the normal person’s behaviour is 
prevailingly concrete, this concreteness can be 
considered normal only as long as it is embedded 
in and codetermined by the abstract attitude. For 
instance, in the normal person both attitudes are 
always present in a definite figure-ground rela-
tion. (Goldstein & scheerer 1964: 8)
« 9 » The various elements of the self-
pattern are not, as Wykretowicz (§3) suggests, 
organized on different levels around a mini-
mal core. as a dynamical gestalt the pattern 
is not characterized by different levels, but 
by an integration via dynamical relations 
(Gallagher & daly 2018). in effect, the unity 
of the self just is the coherency of the pat-
tern held together in its dynamical relations. 
accordingly, i reject the metaphor of core 
and hinge, and i suggest that the notion of 
dynamical integration makes the question of 
phenomenology more complicated.
« 10 » The phenomenology of the self 
goes beyond the pre-reflective minimal ex-
periential aspect since there are also reflec-
tive experiences, and variations of experi-
ence associated with affect, intersubjectivity, 
memory, narrative, etc. although this is a 
complicated phenomenology, i agree with 
Wykretowicz that Husserl offers an impor-
tant take on it. Furthermore, the notion of 
habitus can apply not just to the minimal 
experiential aspect, and not just to cogni-
tive capacities, but to a significant number 
of elements in the self-pattern, including, 
as Wykretowicz (§9) suggests, affective and 
practical processes, dispositions, tendencies, 
and skills (§11). to be clear, once we jettison 
the metaphors of core and hinge, i can agree 
with most of the rest of Wykretowicz’s analy-
sis and with the usefulness of the concept of 
habitus. along with what arminjon calls the 
“physiological habitus” we are bound to find 
a phenomenological habitus.
« 11 » More precisely, the habitus is both 
physiological and phenomenological, and 
always socially contextualized in ways that 
include relations between self and others. as 
Martin Heidegger (1962) might put it, das-
ein is Mitsein all the way up and all the way 
down. That is the case even before a child 
starts to conceive of other minds, or comes 
to the possibility of using theoretical infer-
ence or simulation to mindread. This is not 
to deny that we may learn to think about 
other minds in ways that lead us to situa-
tions in which, as abu-akel suggests (§2) ap-
peal to some “explicit symbolic theory” or 
to a simulation process is possible. abu-akel 
favors the empirical rather than the innate 
versions of tt and st and suggests that 
some hybrid version of these approaches 
comes close to (or perhaps may be inte-
grated with) interaction theory. This kind of 
proposal certainly has been made to seem 
more feasible since the experiments show-
ing that even 13-month-old infants (and 
perhaps even younger infants) are seem-
ingly able to pass spontaneous false-belief 
tests (e.g., Baillargeon, scott & Zijing 2010). 
it is not clear to me, however, that there is, 
as abu-akel suggests, “a shift from an indexi-
cal- to a symbolic-based world of mental 
state representation” that maps onto the 
shift from primary to secondary intersub-
jectivity (§3). Even within the framework 
of secondary intersubjectivity (which starts 
around 9–12 months with joint attention), 
when young infants seem capable of passing 
the spontaneous false-belief tests, it is not 
clear that we have a symbolic-based infer-
ence process that amounts to mindreading 
(Gallagher & Povinelli 2012). This is part of 
a much larger debate that i cannot hope to 
rehearse here, but at the very least we can 
note that abu-akel’s suggestion does not even 
align with his own research, which shows 
symbolic processing appearing only around 
five years of age, and certainly not as early 
as 13 months (abu-akel & Bailey 2001). in 
any case, this is a serious challenge for tt 
accounts.
« 12 » We should, of course, be clear 
about what the evidence shows. abu-akel 
cites Marc Jeannerod (1999) in regard to 
the claim that mirror neurons (Mns) make 
no distinction between self and other. This 
is part of the original Mn doctrine, but the 
original data on Mns show that firing rates 
of these neurons are different for action 
mode (when i am acting) versus observa-
tion mode (when i am perceiving the ac-
tions of others). Jeannerod also points out 
that there are differential overlaps of neu-
ronal patterns that allow for the self-other 
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in addition, there are temporal and connec-
tion differences: activation prior to action 
and integrated with efferent signals for my 
action, versus activation after action unac-
companied by efferent signals, for observed 
action. This is consistent with other empiri-
cal evidence against the matching hypoth-
esis that is central to st, that is, that Mns 
are activated in such a way that activation 
for observation necessarily matches activa-
tion for action (see e.g., Catmur, Walsh & 
Heyes 2007). Pierre Jacob’s (2002) critique 
of the simulation idea that Mns are oriented 
toward the just-past observed action (at-
tempting to match it) is consistent with the 
enactivist interpretation of Mn activation, 
namely, that it is part of action preparation, 
oriented to one’s future response to the other 
person’s action. in any case, this is a chal-
lenge for st.
« 13 »  The studies of congenital heart 
disease cited by abu-akel are fascinating. as 
he suggests, the problems with third-person 
(symbolic) social interactions in such cases 
may be due to social-environmental and af-
fective factors; this reinforces the idea that 
the habitus is integratively physiological, 
phenomenological, and social. This kind of 
integration is also relevant to the point that 
Kaufmann makes. although one can clearly 
distinguish between first-person and third-
person perspectives, it is not always clear 
that the second-person stance behaves itself 
in an orderly way. My interactive stance to-
wards the other person is both a first-person 
and second-person stance at the same time. 
First-person since i experience the other 
from my unique perspective, and second-
person in two senses. First, i am facing the 
other as an other (i.e., where, mutually, i am 
other to her, and she is other to me). This 
is described by Edmund Husserl (1964) 
as a pairing (Paarung), and by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (2012) as an intercorpore-
ity. second, this facing towards the other is 
already permeated by a normativity that is 
not initiated by either of us. We inherit or 
are born into a social milieu that starts to 
shape our experience from the very begin-
ning. Which means that the first-person 
perspective is already second-person – my 
experience is already influenced by my so-
cial milieu – by the social institutions and 
cultural practices that contribute to what my 
world is, and how i perceive it. so, there is 
a second-person face-to-face, and there is a 
second-person a tergo, something operating 
behind our backs that most often we are not 
aware of, and that sometimes, in the form of 
institutions, seems impersonal rather than 
second-personal.
« 14 » We can study all of this from a 
third-person perspective, which allows us to 
capture some of it. We can adopt a scientific 
view and ask, for example, what precisely are 
these social institutions and cultural practic-
es doing to us (perhaps, “little by little”) and 
how do they shape our social interactions? 
This third-person perspective is made pos-
sible by a lot of second-person interactions, 
since science itself is a social institution that 
heavily relies on second-person interac-
tions, and it too shapes our first-person ex-
perience to the extent that we are scientists, 
or are influenced in our thinking by science. 
i take this to be what Kaufmann means when 
she says, “the ontological seat of the first-
person stance, once ‘decentered’ from the 
skull, is nothing but ‘second-person interac-
tions’” (§1).
« 15 » Kaufmann raises a number of con-
cerns. First, she is worried that i reject “the 
social” as a specific ontological domain (§4). 
What she means is that there is “a specific 
domain of reasoning dedicated to social 
entities” (§4), and apparently, i ignore this. 
This is a conception of the social domain 
that emphasizes “the early-developing de-
ontic expectations” that configure social 
relations. it is correct that i do not address 
this in the target article, but that is due to 
of a lack of space more than a lack of inter-
est. and even here i can only point to other 
places where i have discussed such issues 
(Gallagher 2013a; Gallagher & Miyahara 
2012), but also in Gallagher and anthony 
Crisafi (2009), which Kaufmann cites. My 
sense is that we are very much aligned on 
such issues.
« 16 » i strongly endorse Kaufmann’s 
thinking about what she calls “deontic af-
fordances.” Extending the concept of af-
fordances to include social affordances 
(already a concept in Gibson) and cultural 
affordances (ramstead, veissière & Kir-
mayer 2016), has been a recent development 
for enactivist theorists (see, e.g., rietveld & 
Kiverstein 2014; Gallagher 2018). Likewise, 
i agree with Kaufmann’s discussion of “tri-
adic configurations” and the “one-mode,” 
and that they are not reducible to dyadic 
intersubjective interactions. at the same 
time, however, i reject the claim that such 
interactions are “practically irrelevant” (§6). 
indeed, within the structures of impersonal 
institutions or “one-mode” phenomena, 
intersubjective interaction is sometimes the 
only thing we have from which to develop 
resistance, or at least to build resilience. i 
would say something similar for narratives, 
although i agree that they can do only part 
of the job. if narratives sometimes support 
the status quo, as Jürgen Habermas (1987, 
131) suggests, they also have critical poten-
tial since they also allow us to reconfigure 
our way of thinking (Gallagher, forthcom-
ing). Critical narratives allow us to see dif-
ferently and to reconfigure the “we” (tollef-
sen & Gallagher 2017).
« 17 » There are, indeed, distorted in-
tersubjective, second-person interactions. 
as Kaufmann suggests, these may be “closer 
to third-person distanciation and objectiva-
tion” (§7). to be able to say precisely how 
such socio-pathological relations work, and 
how we can fix them, we need to know pre-
cisely how intersubjective interaction works. 
Within the socio-political context, this type 
of project is being pursued by Honneth 
(2008), for example, in terms of the analysis 
of “recognition.” Whether or not Honneth 
gets this right (see varga & Gallagher 2012), 
it is clearly a critical analysis that depends 
on understanding how intersubjective in-
teraction works. That there are “semantic” 
(i would prefer the term “normative” in this 
context) dimensions that impinge on our ev-
eryday lifeworld is undeniable. understand-
ing how they work and how we can fix them 
is a shared goal.
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